Developing innovative products is a primary way for organizations to adapt to changing environments and transform themselves (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995) and thus a cornerstone of organizational competitiveness (Utterback, 1996) . A new product is generally a fusion of new and existing knowledge (Iansiti, 1995) . Rarely does new product development involve exclusively new knowledge and a completely novel design. Most often development is achieved by taking an existing product and modifying or adding to it in some new and potentially significant way. A typical modification is the integration of innovative components into the product (Chesbrough, 2003; Iansiti, 1995; A. Taylor, 2010) . For example, a building can be considered innovative to the extent that it incorporates innovative components such as energy management systems, greywater reuse systems, or highly efficient lighting fixtures. Thus, successful integration of innovative components can bring significant competitive advantage for firms that develop complex unique products.
Several factors contribute to product development success. One key factor is careful internal organization including cross-functional teams, team familiarity, frequent internal communication, and strong project leadership (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995) . For example, functional diversity inherent in cross-functional teams increases the amount and variety of information available for product development, and therefore helps project team members understand the design process more fully, as well as catch downstream problems before they happen. However, along with its various advantages, cross-functionality brings a set of difficulties, which team familiarity, frequent internal communications, and strong project leadership can help mitigate. Team familiarity increases psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999) , enables the transfer of tacit knowledge (Hansen, 1999) enhances coordination and learning (Weick & Roberts, 1993) , and improves performance (Huckman, Staats, & Upton, 2009 ). Frequent internal communication breaks down functional barriers (Dougherty, 1992) and yields enhanced performance. Further, task-related internal communications help developers identify problems early and find better solutions.
Finally, strong leadership is argued to be critical to coordinate cross-functional, collaborative work (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011) .
While helpful to understand product development, the conclusions of prior work typically draw on analyses of complex products (Simon, 1962) in mass production settings such as automobiles (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Hayes, Wheelwright, & Clark, 1988) , robots (Katila & Ahuja, 2002) , computers (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Iansiti, 1993 Iansiti, , 1994 , and telecommunication equipment (Phelps, 2010) . And while these products are complex because they involve a high number of components that interact in non-simple ways (Simon, 1962) , they are mass-produced and not unique. In contrast, the development of complex products that are unique, such as intelligent buildings, high-speed trains, nuclear power plants, space-crafts, and weapon-systems has received much less attention from organizations scholars. By "unique" we mean that every single product is custom-made to some degree. And so while complexity requires a diverse knowledge base that is rarely found within a single firm, uniqueness dictates that every unit of the product is developed separately with some improvisation. Therefore, unique, complex products are generally developed as one-off items by a network of highly specialized firms working together temporarily (Bechky, 2002 (Bechky, , 2006 Goodman & Goodman, 1976) . The temporary nature of these organizations implies that individuals have limited familiarity with one another (Bechky, 2006) . Due to the lack of familiarity and specialization, internal communication is infrequent (Dougherty, 1992) . And in certain networks (e.g., Langolis & Robertson, 1992) , project leadership is minimal. Given these characteristics, in this paper we argue and show that unique, complex products do not fit within the typical model of product development, and because they combine both complexity and uniqueness, their development lacks the features that scholars have deemed as critical to product development success. Given that the standard process for developing new products effectively is often not available, the research question that we ask in this study is how do firms develop innovative unique, complex products?
Two streams of literature are especially helpful in answering this question. The first stream highlights the role of industry standards in ensuring compatibility among components of complex products and facilitating coordination among actors from different firms (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Jain, 2012) . Examples of industry standards include building codes in construction (Dubois & Gadde, 2002) and the IBM System/360 specifications (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) . The second stream shows that in temporary systems such as film production or construction projects, actors coordinate their actions based on institutional knowledge, which is the collection of shared knowledge and understandings about roles and processes within an industry. Institutional knowledge is developed and maintained by apprenticeship and cumulative experience (Stinchcombe, 1959) . For example, structured role systems both enable coordination on a given project as well as maintain continuity across different projects (Bechky, 2002 (Bechky, , 2006 . Together, industry standards and institutional knowledge play a central role in coordinating the temporary networks of specialists in the development of unique, complex products.
Based on the insights from these two streams, we argue and show that unique, complex products can be innovative to the extent that they conform to industry standards and institutional knowledge. In other words, unique, complex products can include innovations that are localized and limited to individual components. Since such "autonomous innovations" (Teece, 1996) have no effect on adjacent components or the overall product architecture, their inclusion in the product does not require new interface definitions or integration processes. Thus, they can be incorporated using existing industry standards (Langolis & Robertson, 1992) and institutionalized knowledge.
However, while research has shown that unique, complex products can be modestly innovative through integration of autonomous innovations, prior work does not effectively deal with integration of systemic innovations that are required for breakthrough innovations and overall product improvement (Ulrich, 1995) . Because incorporating components that represent "systemic innovations" (Teece, 1996) requires readjustment to adjacent components or to the overall product architecture, industry standards and institutionalized knowledge are often less helpful in integration.
The gap we address in this study is how these systemic innovations can be integrated in unique, complex products. This paper examines innovation of unique, complex products through an analysis of the inclusion of innovative components into 112 green buildings in the U.S. We chose this setting because buildings are a particularly good setting to study development of unique, complex products.
Each building is unique because of the tremendous variety of possible site conditions including land and climate, possible building uses, owner aesthetic preferences, and state and local codes and regulations. Thus, no two buildings are ever designed or built exactly alike (Haas, Borcherding, Allmon, & Goodrum, 1999) . A building is highly complex because it contains hundreds of components (e.g., windows, heating and air-conditioning, lighting) that are interconnected through an elaborate product architecture. A building also provides ample opportunities to include innovative components. Specifically, a variety of energy-efficient technologies were included in the buildings in our sample in their quest to obtain certification by the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) program of the US Green Building Council. Some of these technologies represent autonomous component innovations (e.g., daylight sensors) and others systemic component innovations (e.g., direct digital control systems). Although our qualitative interviews highlight the importance of the inclusion of systemic component innovations in attaining high levels of innovativeness (i.e. in this case a high level of energy efficiency), we find that, consistent with our prediction, systemic component innovations have a low probability of inclusion in buildings. We explore the effect of firm integration as a way to overcome the knowledge and coordination problems that systemic component innovations induce.
There are several contributions. Our study extends the literature on innovation and product design to unique, complex products. We describe how such products are designed and produced regularly without team familiarity, frequent communication or strong coordinators. We show that unique, complex products are less likely to incorporate systemic innovations rather than autonomous ones and are therefore often limited in their innovativeness. However, our results also show that through altering internal organization, firms can integrate systemic component innovations into unique, complex products more effectively and consequently develop more innovative end products.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Product development of unique, complex products
Our focus is on the development of unique, complex products. First, complexity refers to the number of components that make up the products and their interactions. According to Simon (1962) , complex products are made up of a large number of components that interact in non-simple ways. The components are connected through elaborate product architectures and design rules (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) . The level of complexity is a function of the number of components, the inter-relatedness of the components, the number of design choices, the elaborateness of the product architecture, the variety of material and information inputs, and the breadth and depth of knowledge and skills inputs require (Hobday, 2000) . Second, uniqueness refers to each unit of the product being distinct to some extent from other units. In other words, unique products involve some degree of customization, and cannot be mass produced. Instead, individual units of the product are developed and produced in one-off projects. Examples of unique, complex products are intelligent buildings with various innovative technologies, space-crafts, and elaborate scientific laboratories with clean rooms and customized equipment. Note that not all complex products are unique, and vice versa. For example, a new model flight simulator is a complex product (Hobday, 2000) , but it is not unique. A simulator is generally made up of standardized components, and several identical simulators can be produced. On the other hand, a piece of designer jewelry is unique, but it is not a complex product by our definition. Note that although uniqueness and complexity are two distinct features, they affect one another. For example, increasing a product's uniqueness may increase its complexity. If the increased customization does not increase the number of components or alter their interactions, complexity remains the same. But if customization involves adding components and changing the product's architecture, complexity increases.
The combination of complexity and uniqueness creates special challenges for product development. Complexity requires a wide breadth of knowledge in multiple domains that correspond to components. Further, the complexity of the components themselves necessitates deep knowledge within each domain. But while complexity requires a diverse knowledge base that is rarely found within a single firm (Hobday, 1998 (Hobday, , 2000 Hobday, Rush, & Joe, 2000) , uniqueness requires improvisation that is difficult to coordinate across firm boundaries. Further, uniqueness dictates that every single unit of the product be developed separately, thus resulting in one-off development projects. In sum, unique, complex products are most often developed and produced in one-off projects by networks of specialized firms that come together temporarily (Bechky, 2002 (Bechky, , 2006 . The boundaries of these temporary product development organizations are very porous, and firms come and go during the course of a single project.
The implication of the temporary nature of the product development projects is that the actors that come together to develop unique, complex products may not have worked together before. Moreover, because product development teams need a diverse knowledge base in order to effectively deal with complexity, the developers themselves come from diverse specializations. The diversity of specializations in turn poses yet another challenge to effective exchanges among product development teams, as actors that belong to different "thought worlds" tend to have difficulties understanding, communicating, and related to one another (Dougherty, 1992) . Finally, some product development projects of unique, complex product are done without strong leaders (Sheffer, 2011) . In each project, one firm generally serves the role of a lead coordinator or system integrator. However, that firm does not always have enough power, knowledge, resources, or time to coordinate the multitude of firms that come and go during the product development process. In construction, for example, general contractors are assumed to play the role of central coordinators.
However, they merely provide a very thin layer of coordination, and the network of subcontractors on a construction project essentially coordinate themselves (Stinchcombe, 1959) . On a construction site with hundreds of workers at any given time, only two or three generally work for the general contractor, with the remaining working for various subcontractors. Moreover, the profit margins of general contractors are extremely low as compared to those of the subcontractors, leaving them unlikely to invest additional resources into coordination beyond the standard thin layer.
By now we hope to have made clear that product development teams of unique, complex products lack the features that scholars have deemed as critical to product development success, including team familiarity, frequent communications, and strong leadership (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995) . A natural question to ask at this point is, how are unique, complex products developed? The answer is that instead of relying on traditional internal organizational features, they rely on industry standards and institutional knowledge (Sheffer, 2011) . Together, standards and institutional knowledge serve as embedded coordination mechanisms and facilitate the development of unique, complex products.
Industry standards specify how different components of the product work together to provide utility to users (Garud et al., 2002; Jain, 2012) . They can serve as design rules that clarifying the product's architecture, component interfaces, and integration protocols (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) . A product's architecture defines which components make up the product and what their roles are. Component interfaces detail exactly how components will connect and interact.
Integration protocols and testing standards assist in assembling the whole product and provide performance measures by which to assess the product and the components that it contains.
Standards are determined through market negotiations by powerful firms or jointly by component producers and users/assemblers (Langolis & Robertson, 1992) or through regulation. Examples of standards are the WWW specifications for the Internet, IBM System/360 specifications, drug testing protocols in pharmaceuticals, and building codes in construction. By providing technical specifications, standards are essentially the "rules of the game" (Jain, 2012 ) the govern the interactions among firms in and across networks.
In addition to industry-standards, institutionalized knowledge about roles and processes serves as a second coordination mechanism (Bechky, 2006; Stinchcombe, 1959) . Institutionalized knowledge is often established and maintained through apprenticeship and training programs provided by professional guilds that provide an institutional framework to govern interactions (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1998; Stinchcombe, 1959) . The knowledge is further elaborated and maintained through experience. With projects as the meeting grounds for professionals from a wide array of firms, both the professionals and the industry as a whole develop a collective memory of what worked and what did not (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1998) . This collective memory further develops and enshrines role definitions, standardized processes, timing, communication norms, etc.
In a sense, individuals enact certain roles during projects, and their enactments sustain role expectations beyond the confines of the individual project (Bechky, 2006) .
In sum, institutional knowledge about roles and processes and industry-wide standardization about design rules facilitate the development and production of unique, complex products by temporary networks of highly specialized firms. Standardized interfaces among components and well-established procedures, as well as worker training in those procedures enable the network of firms at all phases of the supply chain to work smoothly. Professionals know not only how their component interfaces with adjacent components, but also what their role in the product development process is and when they are to enact their role. Since the knowledge is widely shared, there is no need for extensive communications or a particular advantage to personal familiarity with other professionals. Everyone has been trained and socialized to the "rules of the game". This reduces the complexity associated with the products and essentially routinizes what would otherwise be non-routine and confusing. In fact, industry standards and institutional knowledge are so powerful that they essentially negate the need for the centralized control of a hierarchy or a powerful lead organization.
HYPOTHESES
Given the product development model for unique, complex products, in this paper we seek to explore how innovative the products can be. Innovativeness of complex products is generally manifested through the incorporation of innovative components. These innovations can vary both in their degree and type of change that a component innovation involves (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Tyre & Hauptman, 1992) . The degree refers to the innovation's technical novelty, whereas the type of change refers to the innovation's compatibility with the product architecture and the established system of common designs, architectures, roles, processes and practices within the industry. Compatibility with the established system, referred to as "systemic shift" (Tyre & Hauptman, 1992) , is especially critical in unique, complex products.
Along this dimension, we can distinguish between two types of innovations: autonomous and systemic (Teece, 1996) . Autonomous component innovations are compatible with the established system and can be included without modifying other components. They have no effect on the overall product architecture. Thus, the innovative component in a sense "stands alone". In contract, the introduction of systemic component innovations into the system involves significant readjustment to other parts of the system (Teece, 1996) .
Examples of autonomous component innovations in buildings are high efficiency light bulbs that fit into the same light sockets as incandescent bulbs, CO 2 monitoring equipment with interfaces and installation that are essentially the same as those for smoke detectors, or automatic faucets or toilets that are designed and installed in the same way as manually-controlled faucets and toilets.
Examples of systemic component innovations in buildings are radiant floor heating, intelligent building management systems, chilled beams, and ground source heat pumps. Each of these systemic innovations involves extensive deviations from industry standards and institutionalized knowledge about roles and responsibilities, work processes, materials, and component interdependence. For example, radiant floor heating, which is an energy-efficient heating system based on radiant heat transfer instead of the standard forced-air heating, involves an extensive network of pipes underneath a floor and a departure from standard floor construction. On the design side, radiant heating has many implications for adjacent components, such as the choice of flooring (e.g., carpeting is generally discourages; wood can be selected, but should be laminated rather than solid wood; ceramic tile is the most effective choice of flooring; etc.). On the construction side, the sequence of activities performed by the various subcontractors changes in several ways. For example, mechanical workers need to lay the piping before the floor concrete is poured.
Integrating any kind of component innovation into products can be challenging and is likely to generate difficulties. Systemic component innovations are particularly challenging because they alter interfaces between components or the overall product architecture. Henderson and Clark (1990) illustrate such difficulties within a firm in the semiconductor photolithographic alignment equipment industry. However, given that unique, complex products are developed by a temporary network of firms, the difficulties are exacerbated. There are two primary challenges associated with the introduction of systemic component innovations into products. The first challenge is a coordination challenge. Before the introduction of the systemic innovation, firms coordinated their actions by adhering to industry standards and shared understandings about roles and processes.
However, systemic innovations can require these firms to redefine roles, relationships and mental models (Barley, 1986) . These firms need to alter their work processes in order to coordinate the integration of the component innovation. Moreover, some firms that were previously independent have now become interdependent and need to learn new ways of working together. Doing so across firm boundaries and without strong leadership to dictate change and direct actions is difficult and could result in confusion.
The second challenge is a knowledge challenge. Systemic innovations require multiple firms to accumulate new systemic knowledge, which is exceedingly difficult. First, because the official lead firm often does not have sufficient profit margins to provide substantial coordination (Sheffer, 2011) , it may lack the resources to set up training programs and knowledge management systems. Second, not all systemic knowledge is codified, which makes its accumulation slow and difficult (Grant, 1996; Nonaka, 1994; Zander & Kogut, 1995) . Third, the combination of firm heterogeneity and actors' lack of shared history creates difficulties developing trust and a collective team identity, both of which enable of learning and knowledge sharing (Barki & Pinsonneault, 2005; Dougherty, 1992; Levin & Cross, 2004; Levin, Cross, & Abrams, 2002; Van Der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005) . Finally, the temporary nature of product development for unique, complex products results in discontinuous learning (Gann & Salter, 2000) , so even when some actors learn, the knowledge is slow to diffuse throughout the industry resulting in missing knowledge for some actors in subsequent project development projects.
Given the coordination and knowledge challenges, the inclusion of systemic component innovations in unique, complex products is very challenging. In contrast, autonomous component innovations do not lead to extra coordination challenges between firms because no additional interdependencies are added to the product. Product developers can continue to rely on extant standards and shared understandings about roles and processes. Autonomous component innovations do require new knowledge to be accumulated, but unlike systemic innovations, the knowledge is domain-specific and thus limited to specific firms. Thus, the management of the affected firms can set up their own training programs and knowledge management systems.
Further, tacit knowledge is easier to accumulate within a firm (Argyres, 1996; Christensen, Verlinden, & Westerman, 2002; Wolter & Veloso, 2008) . Moreover, developing trust and a collective identity is easier within a firm than across firm boundaries, both of which facilitate learning. Finally, in spite of the discontinuous nature of the development of unique, complex products which hinders the accumulation of knowledge at the industry level, participating firms can individually accumulate domain-specific knowledge over time (Hobday, 2000) .
In sum, innovation in unique, complex products is possible to the extent that the innovative components conform to extant standards and do not require the accumulation of new systemic knowledge. Thus, we hypothesize that due to the coordination and knowledge challenges that systemic component innovations involve, they are less likely to be included in unique, complex products than autonomous component innovations.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Systemic component innovations have a lower probably of being included in unique, complex products than autonomous component innovations.
In many cases, significant levels of overall performance improvement can only be achieved by taking a whole-system approach rather than attempting piecemeal improvements (Ulrich, 1995 Because the two main barriers to systemic innovations are knowledge and coordination challenges, a possible answer is firm integration. By integrating parts of the supply chain, both the knowledge and coordination challenges are more likely to be overcome. Coordination is easier and less costly within a firm than across firm boundaries (Williamson, 1981) . Firm integration aligns the interests of otherwise disparate players. In integrated firms, management can serve as coordinator among specialized divisions. Centralized management can mandate the change, set up training programs, and dictate the use of knowledge management technologies.
Integrated firms can also overcome the knowledge challenges more readily than specialized firms. There are five reasons. The first is that knowledge is easier to accumulate within than across firm boundaries. According to the knowledge-based view of the firm (Grant, 1996) , firms internalize activities in technologically-uncertain, innovative environments because they are better able to coordinate activities ex ante (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992) . Further, when high degrees of tacit knowledge are involved, firms again outcompete markets: research has shown that tacit knowledge is more easily appropriated and transferred within firm boundaries (Argyres, 1996; Christensen et al., 2002; Wolter & Veloso, 2008) . Second, integrated firms have a broader knowledge base and thus greater absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) . The broader knowledge base helps integrated firms better understand the system-wide effects that systemic innovations bring about. They are therefore better able to accumulate relevant knowledge, and thus more likely to adopt and diffuse systemic innovations. Third, the one-off nature of the development and production of unique, complex products results in discontinuous learning and broken feedback loops (Gann & Salter, 2000) . Firm integration increases the likelihood that some project members will have experience working together and can learn together. Given the systemic shift induced by systemic innovations, learning together is critical. Fourth, integration may help bridge the abyss between silos of professions (Dougherty, 1992) and foster trust development which in turn increases knowledge sharing. Fifth, firm integration with moderate levels of interaction between functional divisions allow organizations to strike a balance between exploration and exploitation (Fang, Lee, & Schilling, 2010) . In sum, we hypothesize that firm integration is a better organizational arrangement for the inclusion of systemic component innovations because it helps network firms overcome the coordination and knowledge challenged induced by systemic innovations.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Firm integration increases the likelihood of inclusion of systemic but not autonomous component innovations in unique, complex products.
METHODS
Research setting. The empirical setting for this paper is the design and construction of energy-efficient buildings in the U.S. Energy-efficient buildings are a particularly appropriate example of unique, complex products (Gann & Salter, 2000) that provide ample opportunity to study the integration of various component innovations. They are extremely complex with thousands of interrelated components and subcomponents, many of which are often customized to particular needs. These buildings are also customized and therefore unique with no buildings ever built exactly the same. We conceive of a building's design and construction as a product development project with the building itself as the final product. The final product can vary in its innovativeness and achievement of a high level of energy efficiency.
Like other unique, complex products, the design and production of buildings requires an extensive amount of domain-specific knowledge. In order to deal with this overwhelming knowledge requirement, individuals and firms within the industry have fragmented horizontally into separate crafts/disciplines (Eccles, 1981a (Eccles, , 1981b and vertically into different stages in a project's life cycle (i.e., project shaping, design, construction, commissioning, operations and maintenance).
Firms in the construction industry tend to specialize in one trade and one vertical phase. Although some firms have multiple specialties, the vast majority are experts at only one trade. Further, in the liberal market economy of the US, the composition of project teams, typically selected by competitive bidding at the component level, tends to shift dramatically from project to project (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; J. E. Taylor & Levitt, 2007) . Shifting team compositions is referred to as longitudinal fragmentation (Fergusson, 1993) . Taken together, the three-way fragmentation of the US building industry results in fluid project membership with minimal or no familiarity. Firms come in and out of projects to fill their particular roles. In fact, on any given construction project, most tasks are subcontracted in order to fill the knowledge gaps that the main design firm and general contractor lack. The majority of construction specialties are subcontracted most of the time, though there is significant variation by specialty. Technical, labor, and material trades are almost always subcontracted, while the basic and unskilled trades are subcontracted only fifty percent of the time (Eccles, 1981b) .
Although on paper general contractors are considered project coordinators, in reality they provide a very thin layer of coordination. Further, communication among project firms is minimal.
Instead, each player knows exactly what their role is, when they are to fulfill that role, and how they need to do so. This is made possible by industry standards and industry-wide institutional knowledge, as is the case in other unique, complex products. Construction is one of the most regulated industries, perhaps comparable only to pharmaceuticals with its host of drug safety regulations. Codes and standards are developed and maintained by national, state, and local organizations, and are enacted at the state and local levels (NAHB, 2010). Set to ensure public safety, codes and standards essentially formalize the dominant design that has emerged in construction. Like design rules in other industries (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) , they specify the overall architecture by which components are integrated, the interfaces between components, and the integration process. As such, they serve as an embedded coordination mechanism.
In addition to standards, a large amount of institutional knowledge is shared among industry players. New industry players are socialized through the craft trade unions (Stinchcombe, 1959) .
These unions have clear jurisdictions within which they set professional standards, provide technical training to workers, enforce preferential hiring rights to its members, define what constitutes legitimate communications and procedures, and determine the divisions of work.
Members of a craft institution have shared sense-making and collective understandings of the roles, expectations, and processes within their crafts. In fact, the "professionalization of the labor force in the construction industry serves the same functions as bureaucratic administration in mass production industries" (Stinchcombe, 1959, p. 169) . In sum, craft institutions dictate the roles of all industry players, and the extensive codes and standards dictate the processes by which specific components can be integrated into a completed product. Thus, construction industry members are essentially able to self-synchronize without central coordinating firms. Subcontractors on a construction project coordinate themselves by following well-established procedures that are enshrined by their respective craft institutions, and general contractors need only provide very minimal coordination.
Given this product development model, we expect to find mostly autonomous component innovations in buildings and very few systemic ones. Before describing our sample, it is important to explain how components are selected in this industry. The basic value chain for a building comprises of the following steps: planning (project-shaping and feasibility), design, construction, commissioning, and operations and maintenance. In principal, technology decisions should be made in the planning and design phases. Technology implementation should take place in the construction phase. However in reality, the need to customize each building to some degree results in modifications in the construction processes, which "require workers to go through a learning curve at the beginning stages of each project activity" (Haas et al., 1999, p. 5) . Once all the details are specified, the thousands of building components each comprised of many subcomponents that are made up of different possible materials are installed by hundreds of workers from a plethora of professional specializations.
At first, it appears as if decisions on which technological innovations to incorporate into buildings are made by building owners. Firms chosen to design and construct the building, in this scenario, must respond to exogenous innovations that are "forced" upon them by owners. If this were the case, adoption decisions should be based on straight-forward cost/benefit analyses or other owner preferences without taking into account whether an innovation is localized or systemic.
However, qualitative interviews reveal that adoption decisions are much more intricate. Given the complexity of buildings, most owners are not knowledgeable enough to be able to decide on all technologies on their own. Instead, they consult with consultants and with the design and construction firms on what technologies are available and recommended. Therefore, building professionals have a large impact on the adoption decisions of owners.
Building professionals have a lot at stake in each such decision because their reputations are among their most critical assets (Gann & Salter, 2000) . If they incorporate technological innovations that they are unfamiliar with, they incur the risk of integrating it inappropriately to adjacent components. The problem is that quality problems often arise only when the buildings are occupied, at which point the reputation of the designers and contractors may already be hurt. In contrast to the production of mass produced goods where firms can test various designs and components during the development phase and can fix quality problems before the products are introduced to the marketplace, building professionals do not have this luxury. In a sense, "each house is treated as a pilot model for a design that never had any runs" (Gann, 1996) . Since buildings are very visible, most successes and failures are in the public eye. Visible, public failures can lead to a loss of reputation. Thus, the risks of experimenting with new technologies can be very high.
Building professionals use various tactics to discourage owners from choosing certain technologies. First, they choose which technologies to suggest in the first place. They can choose to omit certain technologies from their list of recommendation. Second, if building owners ask the professionals about particular technologies, they can give them negative reviews and try to dissuade them. Third, even if building owners are not dissuaded, building professionals can assign high prices to the inclusion of such technologies by claiming that their installation will take many labor hours. They are able to do so given the lack of significant prior experience and amount uncertainty associated with innovations. Although building owners may still insist on these technologies, they are likely to forego them given the high cost estimations. Therefore, although building owners choose which components will be integrated into their buildings, building professionals have a tremendous impact on those decisions.
Sample and data
Our sample is drawn from the population of energy-efficient buildings certified by the Leadership and Environmental Design (LEED) program of the U.S. Green Building Council.
LEED is the most common green building certification system in the U.S. today, and one of the most common systems in the world (France, 2007; Potbhare, Syal, & Korkmaz, 2009; Williams, 2010) . It is a system available to builders, designers, and architects who wish to identify their buildings as high performing on environmental and energy dimensions. Since LEED's creation by the U.S. Green Building Council in August 1998, almost 40,000 building projects have registered their intent to be certified and nearly 9,000 have already obtained certification (USGBC, 2011).
LEED evaluates a building's environmental design and offers multiple levels of certification (certified, silver, gold, or platinum) based on the number of environmental elements a building adopts. Each element corresponds to a particular credit and is awarded a specific number of points.
The credits and points structure of the LEED system provides a clear measure of component integration. Points are awarded only once documentation has been submitted to prove that the requirements of particular credits were met. Thus, technology inclusion can accurately be deciphered by examining LEED scorecards and project descriptions. (Fang et al., 2010) . Horizontal ownership integration among MEP firms was discerned from the list of the key project participants in the detailed project descriptions. Firms were considered as integrated when the mechanical, electrical, and plumbing engineers worked at the same firm, and not integrated when the mechanical, electrical, and plumbing engineers came from three separate firms.
The second indicator of firm integration is building procurement method as a proxy for vertical integration. Projects procured with the traditional design-bid-build (D-B-B) approach in which an owner has separate design and construction contracts were considered not integrated. Projects procured with the more vertically integrated design-build (D-B) approach in which an owner has a single contract with an entity responsible for both design and construction were considered integrated. Using these two indicators of horizontal and vertical integration, we constructed a threelevel measure of integration. Project with low integration were those with neither vertical, nor horizontal integration, and were coded with as one. Projects with medium integration were those with only one type of integration, either vertical or horizontal, and were coded as two. Projects with high integration were those with both vertical and horizontal integration, and were coded as three.
We chose to combine the two medium categories because our sample size does not allow us to tease these two apart. Firm integration information was missing for many of the case studies, and we able to test the firm integration hypothesis on a subset of the data that contained the firm information (23 buildings, yielding 528 building-technology observations). There were no statistical differences between the projects for which firm integration data was available and those for which it was unavailable.
Control variables.
A host of control variables were included based on prior literature and background qualitative interviews. Background interviews revealed that the most critical control factor is cost. Thus, we control for technology costs, measured as the added cost over the most common alternative technology in dollars per square foot of building space. Cost data was derived from two industry experts specializing in cost estimations and green buildings. Costs were adjusted for inflation and individual changes in technology prices over the seven-year period that the buildings registered with LEED (2000 LEED ( -2007 . We also control for registration year with LEED because market fluctuations have a large impact on buildings and the construction industry more generally (Maisel, 1963) . We chose to focus on the year that projects registered with LEED instead of the year that were certified because background interviews revealed that most technology decisions are made around the registration time rather than the certification time. Another control variable is owner type. We distinguish between for-profit organizations coded as one and non-profit or government owners coded as zero. The rationale is that although professionals recommend particular building designs or components, owners have the final say in what technologies are included in buildings. We distinguish between for-profit to non-profit owners because for-profit owners have different resources and may include more technologies in their buildings. Moreover, for-profit owners may include more energy-efficient elements as a marketing tool to present themselves as "green" (Corbett & Muthulingam, 2007) or to save on operating expenses later on.
We also control for the size and of the MEP firms, which are the firms that need to design and install the energy-efficient technologies in our sample. Both variables were obtained from firms'
websites. Firms with up to thirty employees were considered small, and coded as one. Firms with thirty one to one hundred employees were considered medium, and coded as two. Firms with over a hundred employees were considered large, and coded as three. When the mechanical, electrical, and plumbing functions were not integrated and three separate firms provided them, we took the average of the firms' sizes. Further, we used a dummy variable to code whether the MEP firms list sustainability or innovation as their core values. The rationale is that firms that state sustainability or innovation as their main value may be more likely to include innovations related to sustainability in their designs. Although these decisions are ultimately an owner's choice, engineers could influence those decisions and convince owners and project managers of the merits of particular technologies. Our final control variable is LEED score, which is based on the number of environmental elements that a building includes. We included it in order to make sure that observed effects are not simply due to attempts to achieve particular LEED levels, and that innovation type and firm integration have an effect over and above the score.
Analytical approach
We used logistic regression to test the probability that a component technology will be included in a building. Each of the 23 technologies can be included in any of the 112 building projects, so there are 2576 inclusion opportunities. Since in each opportunity a technology was either included or not, we use binary logistic regression. Given the nested structure of the data of multiple technologies per project, we use Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) regression method. The GEE method controls for subject-level heterogeneity by accounting for the autocorrelation among the multiple observations per subject (Liang & Zeger, 1986) and is therefore an appropriate regression method for data with multiple or repeated measures for each subject. In our sample, the subject variables are the building projects and the within subject variables are the technologies. We have assumed an independent working correlation matrix and used a robust estimator covariance matrix. We centered the variables to test interactions. To test each model's fit, we rely on Pan's (2001) quasi-likelihood under the independence (QIC) model criterion. It is an alternative to Akaike's information criterion that is widely used for model selection in general linear models and is inapplicable for GEE (Pan, 2001) . Lower QIC score indicates a better model fit. Table 1 includes descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables. On average, component technologies were incorporated into buildings 28% of the time. The independent variables have a high degree of variance and low correlations.
RESULTS
--- Table 1 about here ---Given our missing firm integration data, we can test the second hypothesis only on a subset of our data (n=528). In order to check the robustness of the results of the small sample, we test the first hypothesis on the entire sample (n= 2576) and compare the results to those obtained with the reduced sample. The results are the same. Thus, in Table 2 we report the results for both hypotheses using the reduced sample.
--- Table 2 about here ---
The first model in the regression table includes only controls. As expected, costs are negatively related to inclusion. The more expensive a component technology is, the less likely it is to be included in a building. For-profit organizations include more innovations in buildings they own than non-profit owners. LEED score, year, firm size, and firm core values are not significantly related to inclusion. Model 2 introduces the systemic innovation variable into the equation. The negative and highly significant coefficient for systemic shift (β=-1.02, p<.001) provides a strong support for the first hypothesis. Systemic technologies have a lower probability of being included, even after accounting for technology costs, LEED score, owner type, and year. Further, a comparison of the coefficients of all the predictors in the model reveals that systemic innovation has the greatest effect on the probability of inclusion.
Model 3 introduces the main effect for firm integration. Since this variable is a factor, two variables were entered into the model. The first is high firm integration as compared to low, and the second is medium firm integration as compared to low. Both failed to achieve statistical significance. In other words, firm integration does not significantly affect the probability of technology inclusion. Further, the QIC score is essentially the same in models 2 and 3, indicating The effect sizes, listed in Table 3 , were calculated using the coefficients from the final, most complete model (Model 4 in Table 2 ). A few effects are especially noteworthy. The odds of inclusion of systemic innovations are 84% lower than for autonomous innovations. This effect is dramatic, especially in comparison to the smaller effect of technology costs, which decrease by a mere 8% for every dollar increase in cost above a standard technological alternative per square foot of building space. Cost becomes a more critical factor when the increase is greater than $11 per square foot, which is only the case for five of the twenty three technologies in this study. Even more dramatic, systemic innovations have 186% higher odds of inclusion if the firms are characterized by medium as compared to low integration, and 542% higher odds of inclusion if the firms are characterized by high and compared to low integration. We conducted several sensitivity analyses. For example, instead of testing the effects of low, medium, and high integration, we entered horizontal and vertical integration as separate variables, as well as their interaction. These and additional tests reinforce the robustness of our findings.
--- Table 3 about here ---
DISCUSSION
The standard product development model of cross-functional teams made up of members who are familiar with one another that are engaged in intensive communications and guided by a strong leader does not fit the characteristics of unique, complex products and their production networks. Unique, complex products are developed by networks of specialized firms that come together temporarily for the purpose of producing a unit of the product. The breadth and depth of the required knowledge for the development the products as well as insufficient profit margins sometimes renders lead firms unable to engage in extensive coordination. Instead, network firms coordinate themselves by relying on industry standards and shared knowledge that accumulates over time through training and experience. We show that this model of product development facilitates innovation in unique, complex products so long as the innovation is confined to individual components without inducing system-wide changes. In other words, autonomous component innovations can be incorporated, but systemic component innovations are less likely.
Our main contribution is that the knowledge and coordination challenges of incorporating systemic component innovations in unique, complex products can be mitigated by horizontal and vertical firm integration. Our findings have important implications for the limits of industry standards and institutional knowledge, as well as firm integration as a strategic tool to increase innovation.
The limits of standards and institutional knowledge
The literature on standards (e.g., Garud et al., 2002; Jain, 2012) (Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011) , complexity prohibits such actions in unique, complex products. Professionals are not only unlikely to know how to engage in such bricolage, but they are often unable to do so due to technological constraints.
Firm integration as a strategic tool
By integrating, firms increase their capabilities and lower their transaction costs, and are thus better able to include systemic innovations into unique, complex products. Are firms then better off integrating then? Research across industries has found a general positive correlation between integration and organizational performance (e.g., Barki & Pinsonneault, 2005; Barney, 1991; Hoegl, Weinkauf, & Gemuenden, 2004) . Our findings, however, suggest that a more nuanced investigation is needed. We did not find a correlation between firm integration and innovation inclusion. It was only the interaction term between firm integration and systemic innovation that was significant. While firm integration facilitates the inclusion of systemic innovations, there is no evidence for any advantage to integrate when it comes to autonomous innovations. Moreover, not only is firm integration unhelpful when it comes to autonomous innovations, it can be even detrimental. Integrated firms bear a larger proportion of project costs and risk. Further, while integrated firms outperform non-integrated ones when systemic innovations are introduced, if they remain integrated and a different systemic innovation is introduced, they are likely to suffer performance consequences (Afuah, 2001) .
Shifting firm boundaries is not trivial and cannot be done in response to a single innovation.
In attempting to optimize firm boundaries in order to increase capabilities and reduce costs associated with the inclusion of systemic innovations, it is important to consider the rate type of change in an industry. For example, given the centrality of standards and institutional knowledge in developing unique, complex buildings, innovations in the construction industry tend to be autonomous and the overall rate of change is extremely slow. When a systemic component innovation, such as an intelligent building control system, enters the market place, it is likely to stay potent for some time so long as it reaches a critical mass. Therefore, firms may choose to integrate without worrying that a little while later, their knowledge will be made obsolete by a new systemic innovation.
For example, amidst contractors that are highly specialized to domains such as electrical or mechanical systems, Johnson Controls provides a counter example. In the building management domain, they began as facilities operations for government buildings. Over time, they developed capabilities in controls and began integrating their own building management systems. Over time, they evolved into building management specialists and are completely vertically and horizontally integrated. They provide complete solutions for centrally managed energy systems in buildings to its clients, all the way from requirement specifications, product sale, installation and integration to related building modules, calibration, and maintenance. These examples, along with the findings of the paper, suggest a cyclical process of fragmentation and re-integration that may occur in industries over time in responses to alternating pressures of systemic innovations and efficiency. Prior to the emergence of standards, there is no clear industry-wide shared architectural knowledge. Firms need be integrated to some degree in order to enable coordination and have access to necessary knowledge. However, the emergence of a standards bring about the possibility of developing an industry-wide common language and standards, which in turn enable production to move outside the boundaries of a single firm and into the realm of a network. At this stage, the introduction of an autonomous innovation leaves the shared institutional knowledge intact and therefore firm boundaries need not change. On the other hand, the introduction of a systemic innovation requires a change in institutional knowledge and consequently in the existing industry architectures. Shared templates are obsolete and the shared knowledge and standards can no longer serve as an embedded coordination mechanism among firms, rendering cooperation and new architectural knowledge acquisition without some integration or allying very difficult. Firms are thus better off integrating or allying. Once new standards that are based on the systemic innovation emerge, firms can once again fragment to focus on their core specialties while outsourcing non-core aspects of design and production.
Limitations and future directions
We end with a discussion of the limitations of this paper and several suggestions for future research. First, we suggest that future research tease apart the effects of specific types of integration on innovation inclusion. We examined two types of integration -horizontal integration via firm ownership and vertical integration via contractual arrangements. Data availability did not allow us to examine the effects of each integration separately. We found that being both horizontally and vertically integrated had better results for systemic innovations, but we cannot determine which type of integration is better than the other. Further, future ethnographic studies could examine the effects of team integration on innovation inclusion to decipher the micro-foundations of the results.
Second, our data was limited to one industry. There is reason to believe that systemic innovations would stagnate similarly in other industries in which unique, complex products are develops, but this warrants an empirical investigation. Third, the data in this paper is static. We investigated which innovative components were implemented into particular buildings. While the findings suggest a possible cyclical model of industry evolution in response to the emergence of standards and the introduction of systemic innovations, such a model needs to be substantiated with empirical data.
Conclusion
Our core contribution is that firm integration mitigates the coordination and knowledge problems induced by the introduction of systemic innovations into unique, complex products. The development of unique, complex products tends to take place in temporary organizations of specialized firms and relies on industry standards and institutionalized knowledge. By integrating the firm, firms can transcend the "learning disability" of individual projects and constantly changing project compositions by accumulating a broader knowledge base over time and applying it in future projects. 
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